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KANT ON TELEOLOGICAL THINKING  
AND ITS FAILURES 
MANFRED BAUM

 
I. NATURAL ENDS 
The concept of purposiveness is fundamental for the understanding of 
human action. Rational action is always acting according to a (subjective) 
end; that is, according to concepts of the object of our will, which we 
intend to realize through our acting. Thus, our acting is a more or less 
purposive means for the realization of conceptually represented and 
anticipated consequences of actions, which Kant also calls the matter of 
the will. The intended object of willing and acting, i.e., the objective end, 
can be a product (like an artifact), a change of a given object, or a new 
state of the acting subject itself. In each case, the action is regarded by the 
agent as purposive in view of its intended consequence. In this common 
sense of purposiveness, not only rational actions are purposive for the 
intended end, but also things can be regarded as purposive in relation to 
other things if they are suited to generate or to preserve these things. But 
this property of things, which Kant calls ―external‖ or ―relative‖ 
purposiveness, obviously rests on the transposition of human rationality of 
action to the effects of nature or God. Since there is an obvious analogy 
with human action there seems to be no particular problem for theoretical 
philosophy or philosophy of nature implied in such a transposition. 
The question whether there can be products of nature, which ―even if 
considered in themselves and without a relation to other things‖1 can be 
regarded as ends of this nature or ―natural ends,‖ cannot be answered a 
priori.
2
 For the concept of nature, and of the things generated within it, 
implies not even a hint to purposiveness in any sense as a property of such 
 
 
  Professor of Philosophy, Bergische Universität Wuppertal. [Editor’s Note: The final brief 
rounds of edits to this Article were reviewed and approved on the author’s behalf by David Gray 
Carlson.] 
 1. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 5:375, at 247 (Paul Guyer ed., 
Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2000) [hereinafter KANT, JUDGMENT]. I have used the 2000 Guyer 
and Matthews translation of the CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT with modifications when 
necessary and as indicated in subsequent footnotes. Page references, e.g., 5:375, are by volume and 
page number to the Akademie edition and reproduced in the margins of the 2000 Guyer and Matthews 
translation. The second page number, e.g., 247, refers to the corresponding page in the 2000 Guyer and 
Matthews translation. 
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natural things. But according to Kant, we are confronted with the 
empirical and therefore contingent factum brutum that there exist in nature 
plants and animals, which he calls ―organized beings.‖3 They are, 
according to Kant, the only natural products the possibility of which can 
only be conceived as that of ends of this nature. This means that plants and 
animals ―first provide objective reality for the concept of an end that is not 
a practical end but an end of nature, and thereby provide natural science 
with the basis for a teleology . . . .‖4 This amounts to the introduction of a 
particular kind of causality of nature ―which one would otherwise be 
absolutely unjustified in introducing at all‖5 if these plants and animals did 
not exist. This is the concept of ―teleology‖ according to which one has to 
judge the causality of nature in generating these products, although nature 
in bringing about its effects cannot be regarded as acting in accordance 
with concepts of ends. The concept of a ―natural end‖ is, therefore, an at 
least paradoxical, if not a contradictory, concept.  
If one proposes the thesis ―that a thing is possible only as an end,‖6 one 
wants to say ―that the causality of its origin must be sought not in the 
mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose productive capacity is 
determined by concepts . . . .‖7 In justifying such a claim, one relies on the 
alleged fact that the form of this thing cannot ―be possible in accordance 
with mere natural laws . . . .‖8 Rather, even empirical cognition of the 
cause and effect of things having such forms ―presupposes concepts of 
reason,‖9 as is the case with human action in accordance with concepts of 
ends. If the form of such a thing cannot be explained by empirical laws of 
nature, i.e., if this given form of a product of nature cannot be cognized as 
necessary under the natural conditions of its generation, this contingency 
of its form is, according to Kant, a ground for regarding the causality of its 
origin ―as if it were possible only through reason; but this [reason] is then 
the capacity for acting in accordance with ends (a will); and the object 
which is represented as possible only on this basis is represented as 
possible only as an end,‖10 in other words, as the object of a rational will. 
 
 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 5:376, at 247 (second emphasis added). 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 5:369, at 242.  
 7. Id. at 5:369–70, at 242 (footnote omitted). 
 8. Id. at 5:370, at 242. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
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Such an assumption, however, is at first sight implausible vis-a-vis an 
object ―that one cognizes as a product of nature,‖11 for our incapacity to 
cognize the form of such a natural product as a necessary consequence of 
the conditions of its generation is, by itself, not yet a sufficient reason to 
judge it as ―an end, hence a natural end . . . .‖12 In order to be justified in 
doing this, something more is required.  
This ―something more‖ is expressed in Kant’s assertion: ―a thing exists 
as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself (although in a twofold 
sense) . . . .‖13 For such a determination of the idea of a natural end relates 
to a kind of causality which cannot be connected ―with the mere concept 
of a nature . . . .‖14 Natural causality is a causality of causes that produce 
their succeeding effects without being able to be reciprocally produced by 
their effects. This is already ruled out by the direction of the sequence of 
times. If an effect should be able to produce its cause, it must be earlier 
(according to the temporal order) than its cause, instead of succeeding it. If 
a thing is to exist as cause and effect of itself, this reciprocity cannot 
obtain within the same kind of causality. This is indicated by Kant’s 
mentioning a twofold sense of cause and effect. By this he means that the 
inner causality of natural ends must be distinguished as efficient and final 
causality in order to give the ―somewhat improper and indeterminate 
expression‖15 of a thing ―related to itself reciprocally as both cause and 
effect‖16 a plausible sense. In any case, the concept of such a thing would 
transcend the concept of nature and its kind of causality if it were 
impossible to ―ascribe an end to it.‖17 
Kant elucidates his new definition of a natural end (opposing it to a 
machine) by using the example of a tree, of which one can say in three 
respects that it generates itself and is as such cause and effect of itself: 
(1) A tree generates itself as far as the species is concerned. For the 
other tree that is generated is of the same species as itself. Since trees of 
the same species are effects and causes of other trees, the species ―tree‖ 
preserves itself by unceasingly producing trees, and thereby producing 
itself.
18
 
 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 5:370, at 243 (footnote omitted). 
 14. Id. at 5:371, at 243. 
 15. Id. at 5:372, at 244.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 5:371, at 243 (translation revised).  
 18. See id. 
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(2) A tree also generates itself as an individual. For what we call its 
growth equals a self-generation. ―[T]he matter that it adds to itself with a 
quality peculiar to its species . . . and develops itself further by means of 
material which, as far as its composition is concerned, is its own 
product.‖19 
(3) The parts of the tree also generate themselves indirectly, since the 
preservation of the one reciprocally depends on the preservation of the 
others, and they are in this way cause and effect of each other. This is true, 
for example, of the relation of the leaves as the parts of a tree to it as a 
whole. They ―are certainly products of the tree, yet they preserve it in turn, 
. . . and its growth depends upon their effect on the stem.‖20 And there is 
also the ―self-help of nature in the case of injury in these creatures, where 
the lack of a part that is necessary for the preservation of the neighboring 
parts can be made good by the others . . . .‖21 
In exploiting this example one can grasp what it means that a natural 
product ―yet at the same time [is to be cognized] . . . as possible only as a 
natural end,‖22 if something’s being a natural end means to ―be related to 
itself reciprocally as both cause and effect . . . .‖23 Kant clarifies the 
peculiarity of such a teleological consideration of natural products in two 
steps: 
(1) In order to be a natural end, ―its parts (as far as their existence and 
their form are concerned) [must be] possible only through their relation to 
the whole.‖24 This is a consequence of the thing’s being regarded as an 
end, i.e., as something whose concept ―must determine a priori everything 
that is to be contained in it.‖25 If a thing is regarded in this way, namely, 
that it is conceived as possible only in this way, it is—however—merely 
regarded as a work of art. This means that it is considered as a ―product of 
a rational cause distinct from the matter (the parts), the causality of which 
(in the production and combination of the parts) is determined through its 
idea of a whole that is thereby possible . . . .‖26 Thus, if one one-sidedly 
stresses the character of a natural end as an end, one gets as a result 
merely the product of a rational (i.e., divine or human) artist, e.g., a clock, 
and not a product of nature. 
 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 5:372, at 244.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 5:370, at 242 (translation revised). 
 23. Id. at 5:372, at 244. 
 24. Id. at 5:373, at 244–45. 
 25. Id. at 5:373, at 245. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
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(2) If one stresses the other side, that the natural end is to be a product 
of nature that nevertheless ―contain[s] in itself . . . a relation to ends‖27 but 
is without ―the causality of the concepts of rational beings outside of it,‖28 
then it is required ―that its parts‖ are not combined by an artist according 
to the idea of a whole. Instead, the parts must ―be combined into [the unity 
of] a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. For in 
this way alone it is possible in turn for the idea of the whole conversely 
(reciprocally) to determine the form and combination of all the 
parts . . . .‖29 The idea of the whole, understood in this way, is then not to 
be regarded as the concept of an artist who is through it the cause of his 
product, ―but [merely] as a ground for the cognition [ratio cognoscendi] of 
the systematic unity of the form and the combination of . . . the manifold 
[of the parts] for someone who judges it.‖30 
In these determinations of a natural end, one can recognize Kant as a 
critic of the power of judgement: as a natural end only that natural product 
can be regarded which must be judged as a natural end without giving this 
judgement the validity of acognition of the thing itself. Only a dogmatic 
thinker can misunderstand what must be judged as a natural end as a 
natural end which by itself, independently of this kind of judging, exists in 
nature. This corresponds exactly to the subjectivity of the judgement of 
taste. An object of perception is not judged as beautiful because it is 
beautiful in itself, rather only that object is beautiful, the judging of which 
is based upon a reciprocal promotion of the imagination and the 
understanding of the subject reflecting on the intuited form of the object, 
such that the resulting feeling of pleasure must be regarded as valid for all 
its aesthetic judges. 
Thus, in a natural end effective causes and final causes are united in a 
way that is only subjectively valid. If a body is to be judged as a natural 
end it is conceived as something whose ―parts reciprocally produce each 
other, as far as both their form and their combination is concerned, and 
thus produce a whole out of their own causality . . . .‖31 So far the parts are 
conceived as causae efficientes, without respect to a rational artifex, whose 
concepts would have causality. But in addition to the fact that the natural 
end must be so conceived, the ―concept‖ of this whole ―conversely, [could 
be] in turn the cause of it in accordance with a principle (in a being that 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
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would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate for such a 
product),‖32 i.e., could contain its causa finalis of its production, as it 
would be in the case of a divine artifex or a craftsman. In sum, a natural 
end is conceived as such a natural product in which ―the connection of 
efficient causes could at the same time be judged as an effect through final 
causes,‖33 if there were reasons to assume such a superhuman artifex after 
the model of the Platonic demiurge. 
This thought-experiment results in that determination of natural ends 
that remains when we avoid the fictions of a human or superhuman artist 
and, at the same time, avoid its ambiguous determination of a peculiar 
causa sui, i.e., of a being that relates to itself reciprocally as cause and 
effect. A natural end, then, is a natural product in which 
each part, just as it exists only through all the others, is also 
conceived as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, 
i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient (for 
it could also be an instrument of art, and thus represented as 
possible at all only as an end as the parts of a clock); rather the part 
must be thought of as an organ that produces the other parts 
(consequently each produces the other reciprocally), which cannot 
be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature, which 
provides all the matter for instruments (even those of art); only then 
and on that account can such a product, as an organized and self-
organizing being, be called a natural end.
34
 
This is Kant’s final determination of the ―natural end‖ as a concept of the 
teleologically reflecting power of judgement, through which natural 
products must be thought of in relation to our human, discursive 
understanding. This is done without granting that an objective reality 
could be attributed to this concept, independent of its relation to our 
understanding. 
II. THE TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF PURPOSIVENESS 
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant has introduced the 
concept of purposiveness not as a concept that is indispensable for 
reflection upon particular products of nature, but as a transcendental 
principle of the reflecting power of judgment regarded as an a priori 
 
 
 32. Id. (translation revised). 
 33. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 34. Id. at 5:373–74, at 245 (translation revised). 
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legislative faculty.
35
 Its legislation is, however, only an act of heautonomy, 
i.e., of its legislation for its own use in the ascent from the particular in 
nature to the universal, within the realm of empirical concepts and of 
particular empirical laws. The transcendental principle of the 
purposiveness of nature, in its particular laws for the reflecting power of 
judgment, asserts that these empirical laws are not—as is the case with the 
transcendental or strictly universal laws of nature—given a priori through 
the pure understanding, but nevertheless must have a systematic unity. 
Since our understanding, through its categories and principles, first makes 
possible a nature in general as a system of appearances in accordance with 
transcendental laws, one can express the legislating of the reflecting power 
of judgment in a popular manner like this: through it the principle is 
established that nature must in its particular and empirical laws, which are 
left undetermined by those strictly universal laws, be so regarded as ―if an 
understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of 
our faculty of cognition, in order to make possible a system of 
experience . . . .‖36  
This subjective purposiveness of nature for our faculties of cognition in 
their empirical use is what the reflective power of judgment assumes in its 
own favor. One can ask, then, in which sense this principle can be called a 
transcendental one and whether something like a transcendental deduction 
can be provided for it, through which this assumption can be justified. 
Under a transcendental principle, Kant, here, understands a principle 
―through which the universal a priori condition under which alone things 
can become object of our cognition at all is represented.‖37 Thus it is an 
ontological principle, but one that does not deal with possible things in 
general; instead it addresses the conditions of possible cognition of things 
through our human faculties of cognition. The principle of the 
purposiveness of nature for our faculties of cognition deals with ―objects 
of possible empirical cognition in general‖38 and represents, as such, the 
universal condition a priori, but not of the possibility of our cognition of 
objects in general, rather, only of objects of our human experience. The 
totality of these objects is nature, ―but not merely as nature in general, but 
rather as nature as determined by a manifold of particular laws.‖39 
Accordingly, such a transcendental principle requires a transcendental 
 
 
 35. See id. at 5:179, at 66. 
 36. Id. at 5:180, at 67.  
 37. Id. at 5:181, at 68.  
 38. Id. at 5:182, at 69. 
 39. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
34 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:27 
 
 
 
 
deduction, but this cannot be established in the manner of the deduction of 
the categories and of the principles of their use. This is because the 
concept of the purposiveness of nature for our reflecting power of 
judgment is not a category, not a concept of the pure understanding of an 
object of intuition in general, which corresponds to the necessary forms of 
thinking. Instead of a proof of the objective validity of the concept of 
purposiveness, Kant only adduces the argument that the unity of nature, 
conceived according to this purposiveness, i.e., as a ―unity of nature in 
accordance with empirical laws . . . must . . . necessarily be presupposed 
and assumed, for otherwise no thoroughgoing interconnection of empirical 
cognitions into a whole of experience would take place . . . .‖40 This is why 
―the power of judgment must . . . assume it as an a priori principle for its 
own use that what is contingent for human insight in the particular 
(empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity, . . . in the 
combination of its manifold into one experience . . . .‖41 It is already 
obvious that the concept of the purposiveness of nature for the reflecting 
power of judgment can have no objective validity and that nevertheless 
this principle is indispensable for this power of judgment. 
Although Kant in his introductions to the third Critique never gives an 
example for such a systematic unity of empirical laws of nature, we know 
from his other works and his Nachlass that Galileo’s law of falling bodies, 
Kepler’s laws of the movements of the planets around the sun, and 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation are for Kant the model of such a 
systematic unity of natural laws. Newton’s mutual attraction of masses, 
and his formula for the law of this attraction, is itself a particular empirical 
law from which, through mathematical transformation, the particular laws 
of Galileo and Kepler can be derived. In turn, one can say of these 
particular laws that they deal with a lawlikeness of the motions of bodies 
indicating in an as yet undetermined manner an unknown common cause 
of motion that, however, cannot be a priori determined out of the 
accelerated motions themselves. Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws are thus 
purposive for Newton’s dynamical world-system of moving forces, and 
they also have historically prepared Newton’s discovery. But only after 
this discovery can one say that these three laws together constitute a 
purposive unity, i.e., a lawlikeness of the logically contingent particular 
under a universal law, which is confirmed by the two particular laws but 
which itself is also merely contingent. Kant’s transcendental principle of 
 
 
 40. Id. at 5:183, at 70.  
 41. Id. at 5:183–84, at 70 (second and third emphases added). 
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purposiveness is, it is true, valid for nature in the manifold of nature’s 
empirical laws. However, Kant’s critical philosophy is neither of 
philosophy of science, be it biology or mathematical physics, nor of the 
progress of scientific cognition in the sense of Neo-Kantianism or Thomas 
S. Kuhn. Thus we are, as critical philosophers, admittedly ―delighted 
(strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when we encounter such a 
systematic unity among merely empirical laws, . . . even though we 
necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity . . . .‖42 
The only possible ―deduction‖ of the concept of a purposiveness of 
nature for our power of judgment as a transcendental principle of object 
cognition consists, as we have seen above, only in the indication that 
―unity of experience (as a system in accordance with empirical laws),‖43 
which is in itself contingent, ―must still necessarily be presupposed and 
assumed, for otherwise no thoroughgoing interconnection of empirical 
cognitions into a whole of experience would take place . . . .‖44 Our 
transcendental principle is thus only a maxim of the the power of 
judgment for its own empirical use, a subjective principle originating from 
its ―heautonomy.‖45 
From this transcendental principle, Kant proceeds first to the 
―combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the 
purposiveness of nature‖46 and then to ―the aesthetic representation of the 
purposiveness of nature.‖47 Both of them underscore the subjectivity of 
this principle by exposing the sensible intuition of the human being and its 
faculty of feeling as that for which nature is to be purposive. The second 
connection established by Kant between his transcendental principle and 
its use in judging objects of nature is the one to ―the logical representation 
of the purposiveness of nature.‖48 One can represent purposiveness in an 
object of experience out of an objective ground if one is attentive to the 
―correspondence of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, in 
accordance with a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of 
this form.‖49 This kind of purposiveness relates the form of the object ―to a 
determinate cognition of the object under a given concept . . . .‖50  
 
 
 42. Id. at 5:184, at 71.  
 43. Id. at 5:183, at 70.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 5:185–86, at 72.  
 46. Id. at 5:186, at 73.  
 47. Id. at 5:188, at 75.  
 48. Id. at 5:192, at 78.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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In the use of the given concept for the cognition of an object ―the 
business of the power of judgment in using it for cognition consists in 
presentation (exhibitio), i.e., in placing a corresponding intuition beside 
the concept . . . .‖51 This is the business of the determinating power of 
judgment. It consists either in the construction or the schematization of the 
concept of the understanding in its theoretical use, which both are 
performed by the imagination, or in the technically-practical use of the 
concept in which the imagination proceeds ―as in art, when we realize an 
antecedently conceived concept of an object . . . .‖52 In the case of the 
reflecting power of judgment, the presentation (Darstellung) of the 
concept is performed ―through nature, in its technique (as in the case of 
organized bodies) . . . .‖53 But this only happens, ―when we ascribe to 
[unterlegen] it[, i.e., nature,] our concept of an end for judging its 
product,‖54 that is, when we judge nature in such a way as if it would 
generate its products according to concepts. In this case we represent ―not 
merely a purposiveness of nature in the form of the thing, but this product 
of it is represented as a natural end.‖55 
Here, again, Kant connects the transcendental principle of the 
―subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms, in accordance with 
empirical laws‖56 with the purposive constitution of objects within nature. 
Since we already attribute to nature, according to the transcendental 
principle, ―as it were a regard to our faculty of cognition, in accordance 
with the analogy of an end . . . we can regard . . . natural ends as the 
presentation [Darstellung] of the concept of a real (objective) 
purposiveness . . . .‖57 And since this kind of purposiveness is judged by 
understanding and reason ―in accordance with concepts,‖ Kant calls it ―the 
logical representation of the purposiveness of nature.‖58 
Now Kant is completely aware of the fact that to this kind of judging 
natural ends, in contrast to the aesthetic judgment of natural forms, 
no a priori ground at all can be given why there must be objective 
ends of nature, i.e., things that are possible only as natural ends, 
indeed not even the possibility of such things is obvious from the 
 
 
 51. Id. at 5:192–93, at 78.  
 52. Id. at 5:193, at 78.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 5:193, at 79, 
 58. Id. at 5:192, at 78.  
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concept of nature as an object of experience in general as well as in 
particular . . . .
59
 
Natural ends are enigmatic facta bruta, the possibility of which we can 
only cognize out of their actuality. Thus Kant does not derive the judging 
of natural products as natural ends from his transcendental principle. He 
only adduces a kind of motive for this use of the reflecting power of 
judgment: 
[T]he power of judgment, without containing a principle for this in 
itself a priori, in order to make use of the concept of ends in behalf 
of reason, merely contains in some cases that come before it (certain 
products) the rule after that transcendental principle has already 
prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end (at least 
as far as form is concerned) to nature.
60
  
Thus the ―logical,‖ i.e., the teleological judging of natural things as natural 
ends is only an analogy to the principle of the formal and subjective 
purposiveness of nature for our faculties of cognition and not justified by 
it. Just as little justification is provided by the aesthetic judgment of 
natural things as beautiful objects. 
Although we thus must judge organized bodies as self-organizing 
systems ―in accordance with the idea of an end of nature[,] . . . [one] 
cannot adduce any fundamental principle from the concept of nature, as 
object of experience, that would warrant ascribing to it a priori a relation 
to ends . . . .‖61 Nevertheless, experience proves that such natural products 
exist whose objective purposiveness we cognize ―empirically‖ through 
―many particular experiences‖ and the ―unity of their principle.‖62 This is 
all that Kant says in justification of teleological judging. The inclination of 
human beings to judge nature according to concepts of ends has thus no 
theoretically cogent reasons and is presumably based on an interest of 
practical reason. 
III. KANT AS A CRITIC OF TELEOLOGICAL THINKING 
Kant has frequently pointed to the unavoidability of teleological 
thinking, particularly in the empirical cognition of so-called natural ends. 
In 1755, in his Universal History of Nature and Theory of the Heaven, and 
 
 
 59. Id. at 5:193, at 79.  
 60. Id. at 5:193–94, at 79.  
 61. Id. at 5:194, at 80 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
38 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:27 
 
 
 
 
in 1790, in his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant seems to assert the 
same thing, namely, that the generation of our planetary system can be 
explained in accordance with mechanical laws, but ―the generation of the 
single plant or a caterpillar from mechanical grounds [cannot] be distinctly 
and completely known by us.‖63 On a closer look, one can recognize the 
differences between the two denials of our ability to such cognition. In 
1755, Kant says, ―sooner . . . the origin of the entire present constitution of 
the world can be cognized, than the generation of a single plant . . . or a 
caterpillar can be . . . cognized by us.‖64 After he has himself given the 
explanation of the heavenly structure, which was comparatively easy, it is 
a difficult future task to give a corresponding explanation for plants and 
animals. Thirty-five years later he writes: 
[I]t would be absurd for humans even to make such an attempt or to 
hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make 
comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to 
natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather, we must 
absolutely deny this insight to human beings.
65
  
This assertion of Kant is, in 1790, based on his theory of the possibility 
of pure and empirical cognition of objects through our understanding, 
which was not at Kant’s disposal in 1755. However, the impossible for 
humans is not in itself or objectively impossible. In nature itself, ―if we 
could penetrate to the principle of [this] nature in the specification of its 
universal laws known to us,‖66 there could well ―lie hidden [a] ground 
sufficient for the possibility of organized beings without the assumption of 
an intention underlying their generation‖67 (i.e., in the mere mechanism of 
nature). Thus we cannot say, that because we can cognize these things, i.e., 
organized beings, ―only under the idea of ends[,] we would also be 
justified in presupposing that this is a necessary condition for every 
thinking and cognizing being, thus that it is a condition that depends on 
the object and not just on our own subject.‖68 Therefore, the proposition 
―there is a God‖69 (i.e., the conclusion of the argument from design) is ―a 
proposition resting only on subjective conditions, namely those of a 
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reflecting power of judgment appropriate to our cognitive faculties,‖70 
which is, misleadingly, expressed ―as objectively and dogmatically 
valid . . . .‖71 
Kant’s position with regard to the, for humans, unavoidable 
teleological way of thinking is that the assumption of the objective reality 
of natural ends, i.e., of organized natural products whose causality we can 
only cognize in accordance with ―the idea of ends,‖ rests merely on the 
specifically human conditions of cognition. This is why ―we cannot make 
any objective judgment at all, whether affirmative or negative, about the 
proposition that there is an intentionally acting being as a world-cause . . . 
at the basis of what we rightly call natural ends . . . .‖72 But what we can 
cognize is that we, and why we, in accordance with ―our own nature . . . 
absolutely cannot base the possibility of those natural ends on anything 
except an intelligent being . . . .‖73 
But what is our own nature in respect of our specifically human faculty 
of cognition? Kant answers this question in sections seventy-six and 
seventy-seven of his third Critique. Here we learn to understand why we 
cannot escape teleological thinking, and why this subjective unavoidability 
cannot ground any objective cognition of nature and of ourselves. 
However, these sections do not deal with an empirical (i.e., 
anthropological) cognition of the human faculties of cognition, rather they 
deal with the a priori principles of cognition ―of a finite rational being in 
general,‖74 from which it follows that ―we cannot and must not conceive 
[denken] otherwise.‖75 As his third example for a subjective necessity of 
human thinking, Kant adduces the ―distinction‖ we find ―between a 
natural mechanism and a technique of nature, i.e., a connection to ends in 
it . . . .‖76 This depends, he argues, on the peculiarity of our discursive 
understanding that it ―must go from the universal to the particular . . . .‖77 
Since every cognition consists either in bringing objects under concepts 
already available to us (as well as in determining the objects through these 
concepts), or in bringing objects of which we already have a concept under 
another concept (which we attribute to these objects as a common 
predicate), our determining power of judgment presupposes that the 
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objects, which are to be determined, are all suited, i.e., purposive for this 
predication, although they differ in many respects from what is thought in 
their common predicate. Thus, all determining judgments presuppose a 
logical purposiveness of the particular for the universal under which the 
particular is to be subsumed. This purposiveness can itself not obtain if 
there is no universal law for the particular, i.e., a special rule in accordance 
with which the particular that is to be subsumed is not contingently but 
necessarily so constituted that it can be subsumed as a (particular) case 
under a higher (universal) law (as a casus datae legis). However, every 
particular contains something contingent in ―regard to the universal,‖78 
which is not already contained in the universal. This is also true of 
particular laws of nature, which are to stand, together with others, under 
higher natural laws (and, of course, under the transcendental laws of 
nature in general). Thus, they must have some kind of unity insofar as they 
are all cases of a common higher natural law. This ―lawlikeness of the 
contingent‖ of the particular natural laws is their purposiveness as 
particular cases for being determined through a general law. Therefore, the 
deducibility (e.g., by mathematical transformation of equations) of the 
particular laws from more universal laws of nature is not logically 
warranted, i.e., cannot be established analytically from the concept of the 
object with which the general law is dealing, but rests exclusively on the 
logically contingent and yet lawlike agreement of the particular laws with 
their determining more universal laws of nature. Thus we have, at last, 
discovered the reason why ―the concept of the purposiveness of nature in 
its products is a concept that is necessary for the human power of 
judgment in regard to nature . . . .‖79 This transcendental principle of the 
reflecting power of judgment thus follows from the discursiveness of the 
human understanding, which means that it ―must go from the universal to 
the particular . . . .‖80 This is true of concepts in relation to their objects 
and for (more) universal laws in relation to the particular laws under them. 
But this purposiveness of nature in its products and in their particular laws 
provides no objective determination of these objects themselves. It is only 
―a subjective principle of reason for the power of judgment . . . .‖81 This 
principle is, in fact, merely a maxim, but it ―is just as necessarily valid for 
our human power of judgment as if it were an objective principle.‖82 
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After we have seen where the assumption of a subjective purposiveness 
of nature for our power of judgment comes from, Kant explains the 
possibility of the concept of a natural end likewise out of ―a special 
character of our (human) understanding . . . .‖83 When we say about a 
natural product that it is a natural end, we think it through an ―idea.‖ But 
the product itself is given in nature and this nature is then represented as if 
it had the causality of a being, which acts according to ends. The natural 
end is an object given in experience upon which one can reflect ―according 
to that idea.‖84 Now the idea of a natural end presupposes ―the idea of a 
possible understanding other than the human one,‖ ―grounding‖ the 
natural end.
85
 Thus one can say: ―certain products of nature, as far as their 
possibility is concerned, must, given the particular constitution of our 
understanding, be considered by us as intentional and generated as ends, 
yet without thereby demanding that there actually is a particular cause‖86 
that acts according to ends and is, therefore, an understanding. Why is 
there no necessity to make such an inference? It is because ―another 
(higher) understanding than the human one might be able to find the 
ground of the possibility of such products of nature even in the mechanism 
of nature . . . .‖87 
Thus, we must assume that our understanding is of a peculiar 
constitution, which is based on the fact that the particular, to be brought 
under universal concepts of the understanding, has a contingency for our 
understanding. ―[F]or through the universal of our (human) understanding 
the particular is not determined, and it is contingent in how many different 
ways distinct things that nevertheless coincide in a common characteristic 
[Merkmal] can be presented to our perception.‖88 The discursiveness of 
our understanding as a faculty of concepts as common marks of the 
particulars given to it by nature is thus the cause for the logical 
contingency of the particular. But if we conceive of an understanding 
completely independent of sensibility and itself, by its own spontaneity, 
capable of intuition, then such an intuitive understanding would not have 
to ―go from the universal to the particular and thus to the individual 
(through concepts) . . . .‖89 For such an understanding ―that contingency of 
the agreement of nature in its products in accordance with particular laws 
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for [our] understanding, which makes it so difficult for ours to bring the 
manifold of these [particular laws] to the unity of cognition, is not 
encountered . . . .‖90 This difficulty, and the contingency of the particular, 
is due to the fact that for our understanding, ―the particular is not 
determined by the universal, and the latter therefore cannot be derived 
from the former alone . . . .‖91 From this contingency, it follows that the 
agreement of the natural things with our power of judgment can only be 
represented by us as due to a kind of purposiveness of nature. The origin 
of this supposed purposiveness from our peculiar understanding becomes 
obvious when we conceive of another understanding in relation to which 
―we can represent that agreement of natural laws with our power of 
judgment, which for our understanding is conceivable only through ends 
as the means of connection, as necessary.‖92 
It is thus a property of our understanding ―that in its cognition . . . it 
must go from the analytical universal (of concepts) to the particular (of 
the given empirical intuition) . . . .‖93 If we want to cognize, for example, 
the cause of a natural product, we determine the pure concept of cause, 
given to us by our understanding, through an empirical intuition, which 
comes from our senses. The understanding thus determines nothing ―with 
regard to the manifold of the empirical intuition‖94 through its concept. It 
―must expect this determination for the power of judgment from the 
subsumption of the empirical intuition . . . under the concept.‖95 But if we 
conceive of an understanding, which ―is not discursive like ours but is 
intuitive,‖96 it will go ―from the synthetically universal (of the intuition of 
a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts . . . .‖97 
An intuitive understanding would thus cognize the product of nature as 
that particular, which becomes possible through the limitation of an 
underlying whole, just as particular spaces are cognized as possible 
through the limitation of the all-encompassing one whole of space. In the 
representation, i.e., in the idea of the intuitive understanding of a whole, 
―there is [thus] no contingency in the combination of the parts, in order to 
make possible a determinate form of the whole . . . .‖98 But if, as is true for 
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our discursive understanding, the whole is composed from given parts, the 
resulting form of this whole is possible in very many ways. Our discursive 
understanding is ―dependent on‖ the contingency of its composition of 
parts, because it ―must progress from the parts, as universally conceived 
grounds[ of possible wholes,] to the different possible forms [of wholes], 
as consequences, that can be subsumed under [them].‖99 
Kant then confronts the whole, consisting of parts with the two kinds of 
understanding. When we represent a whole through our discursive 
understanding, we represent the ―possibility of the whole as depending 
upon the parts . . . .‖100 But if we represent the way in which the intuitive 
understanding conceives of a whole, we represent ―the possibility of the 
parts (as far as both their constitution and their combination is concerned) 
as depending upon the whole . . . .‖101 However, since this ―would be a 
contradiction in the discursive kind of cognition,‖102 for which wholes 
depend on parts, such a dependence of the parts upon the whole according 
to the ―peculiarity of our understanding‖103 can only be represented in such 
a way that not the whole itself, but ―the representation of a whole 
[contains] the ground of the possibility of [the] form [of this whole] and of 
the connection of parts that belong to that [whole].‖104 With this last step 
of his argumentation, Kant has, indeed, given an explanation of 
teleological thinking in its subjective necessity from our discursive 
understanding:  
But now since the whole would in that case be an effect (product) 
the representation of which would be regarded as the cause of its 
possibility, but the product of a cause whose determining ground is 
merely the representation of its effect is called an end, it follows 
that it is merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our 
understanding that we represent products of nature as possible only 
in accordance with another kind of causality than that of the natural 
laws of matter, namely only in accordance with that of ends and 
final causes . . . .
105
 
The teleological thinking applied to natural things is thus a subjectivly 
necessary consequence of the discursiveness of our cognition. After we 
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have found this explanation by a kind of cognizing ourselves, we cannot 
assert that the ―mechanical kind of generation‖106 of organized bodies is 
objectively impossible. From such a mechanical explanation ―there arises 
no concept of a whole as an end, whose internal possibility presupposes 
throughout the idea of a whole on which even the constitution and mode of 
action of the parts depend, which is just how we must represent an 
organized body.‖107 However, since this kind of representing is only 
necessary for our discursive understanding it does not follow that the 
mechanical generation of such a body ―is impossible . . . for every 
understanding . . . .‖108 And since it is at least possible to consider the 
material world as mere appearance, we can conceive of ―a supersensible 
real ground [of] nature, although it is unknowable for us‖109 through which 
nature as an object of the senses is determined in accordance with 
mechanical laws and at the same time as an object of reason that is 
determined ―in accordance with teleological laws . . . .‖110 This kind of 
reconciliation can be conceived without contradiction, but it also implies 
that nature as object of experience cannot be cognized as being determined 
―in accordance with teleological laws‖111 as objectively valid principles. 
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